‘A sledgehammer to crack a nut’? Naval gunfire support during the Malayan Emergency by Paget, Steven
Steven Paget 
Forthcoming in Small Wars and Insurgencies, 28:2, 2017. This is the post-print version and must 
not be copied or cited without permission. 
 
 ‘A Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut’? Naval Gunfire 
Support during the Malayan Emergency 
 
Apart from an element of surprise warships provided little more than convenient 
gun platforms and their employment as mobile artillery was subject to the 
limitations of all offensive shelling in the Malayan campaign: imprecise co-
ordinates and an uncertainty which way the guerrillas would move which made it 
a matter of harassment rather than destruction.1 
 
David Ucko has observed: ‘In the haste to draw lessons from this exceptional campaign, the 
Emergency has tended to be over-farmed for useful parallels, some of which show scant regard for 
the campaigns specificity and content.’2 The ‘specificity’ of the Emergency must be taken into 
consideration as some of the elements of the conflict were unique to Malaya, but that does not 
mean that there are not lessons to be gleaned if they are understood in context. In 2006, Harry 
Miller posed the question as to whether the force massed against the Malayan Races Liberation 
Army (MRLA) represented ‘a brick to crush an ant’.3 While that issue is debatable, the same 
question could be asked about the use of naval gunfire support (NGS). NGS is an oft-derided and 
misunderstood capability. Its merits have been regularly questioned and perhaps never more so 
than during the Malayan Emergency. 
In assessing a bombardment by HMA Ships Queenborough and Quickmatch in January 
1957, Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey opined: ‘naval power was inappropriate to the circumstances 
of the Malayan Emergency’.4 At first glance, the lesson about NGS might appear to be that it was 
unsuitable – akin to using a sledgehammer to crack a nut – or, at the very least, used excessively. 
The challenges presented by operating in an environment dominated by dense jungle and against 
an enemy that was relatively small numerically and elusive by nature reduced the frequency with 
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which NGS was required and, sometimes, the effect that could be achieved. However, when enemy 
forces could be contained or flushed into the open or when other forms of fire support were not 
available, NGS demonstrated a usefulness that exceeded the conventional wisdom about its 
efficacy in Malaya. 
The utility of firepower during insurgencies has been a contentious issue with some 
analysts pointing to a perceived ‘hyperfocus on firepower and killing the insurgent enemy’.5 The 
Vietnam War has dominated much of the discussion, but the Malayan Emergency remains hotly 
debated. The majority of scholarly attention has centered on the provision of firepower by the 
Royal Air Force (RAF) and Commonwealth air forces, which remains ‘controversial’.6 NGS has 
been less controversial, but that is because it has largely been dismissed. Firepower is not and 
never will be a silver bullet in combating insurgency. Indeed, as James Corum has written: ‘A 
counterinsurgency strategy that relies overwhelmingly on military forces and military 
operations—and ignores the social, political, and economic aspects of the insurgency—will not 
lead to the desired endstate or even close to it.’7 As a result, in most cases, the provision of 
firepower is only a minor consideration to accomplish a limited mission. However, firepower has 
fulfilled an important role in the past and it is incumbent on militaries to utilise every instrument 
at their disposal when they can be used effectively. Although NGS may have only proven useful 
under certain circumstances, similar situations have arisen in both earlier and later conflicts. While 
it is easy to dismiss the utility of NGS, the capability has been effective in the past and remains 
relevant in the contemporary operating environment. 
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Naval Gazing: Recognition of the Maritime Counterinsurgency Role   
Sadly, the Navy’s role is not well understood because many who discuss irregular 
warfare wear ‘cammies’ and emphasize ground-centric perspectives.8 
                        Sinclair Harris 
Counterinsurgency has become a vogue topic, but the maritime aspects have been under-examined. 
Land power remains the principal focus of studies of the military aspects of counterinsurgency 
campaigns. The notion that ‘small wars and counterinsurgencies are won or lost by the troops on 
the ground’, prompted Andrew Mumford to note that it is ‘to the army that we usually turn to 
understand victory or defeat’.9 The traditional focus is not unfounded because as Corum reminds 
us: ‘Counterinsurgency is inherently land-centric because it is about populations, and populations 
live on the land.’10 Furthermore, while ‘insurgency can take place at sea (and along coasts and 
rivers)’, Martin Murphy has pointed out that it always has ‘the aim of achieving effect on land’.11 
The supporting roles played by air and naval forces has led to concomitantly fewer studies 
of their contributions, although there has been a surge in air power studies over the past two 
decades. Counterinsurgency operations have been interwoven into air power histories and theory 
since their emergence given that ‘almost from the moment the airplane was invented…Western 
powers found it to be an exceptionally useful weapon for fighting rebellious tribesmen in the 
colonies’.12 The perception that air power could potentially be a panacea to economic, logistic and 
manpower constraints has ensured that it has received greater scholarly attention than the naval 
role. 
 The relative dearth of studies on the maritime aspects of counterinsurgency operations can 
be attributed to a range of factors. The phenomenon known as ‘sea blindness’ – the failure of 
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politicians, the media and the public to understand the significance and use of the sea – has been 
the subject of much debate.13 Without delving into the nuances of ‘sea blindness’, the limited 
attention devoted to the maritime element of counterinsurgency can be viewed as a reflection of a 
broader trend.14 In addition, larger western navies have tended to prioritise blue water over green 
and brown water capability. The cumulative result has been an under-estimation of the maritime 
contribution to counter-insurgency. The neglect of the naval side can also be attributed, in part, to 
the attention devoted to recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq where the naval role has been 
somewhat less visible than the air and land contributions. 
 The significance of naval forces is also often overlooked as insurgent groups generally 
have limited maritime capacity in comparison to their opposition. In particular, the absence of 
significant naval combat capability on the part of insurgents has tended to keep the focus on land 
forces. However, when counterinsurgency operations have confronted a significant maritime 
threat, the importance of naval forces has been highlighted. Bruce Hoffman has emphasised that 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had ‘its own blue-water navy, with ocean-going 
cargo vessels alongside a formidable array of riverine (brown water) and coastal (green water) 
attack craft’.15 Additionally, the LTTE employed underwater assets, mines and suicide boats to 
target Sri Lankan Navy vessels.16 In 2007, it was recorded that since its formation in 1984, the 
LTTE had destroyed ‘between a third and a half’ of the Sri Lankan Navy’s coastal fleet and had 
conducted piracy against commercial vessels.17 The Sri Lankan experience demonstrated that it 
is complacent to dismiss or overlook the significance of the maritime role in counterinsurgency.18 
 An argument could also be made that maritime counterinsurgency roles have sometimes 
been overlooked as they have been mislabelled. In reassessing the political agitation of Daniel 
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O’Connell’s ‘Repeal Association’, which peaked in 1843, and the ‘Young Ireland’ rising of 1848, 
Jerome Devitt contended that the Royal Navy’s mission ‘fell outside the traditional view of 
naval/gunboat diplomacy, and is better described as having a naval counter-insurgency role’.19 In 
addition, while the contrast between conventional and counterinsurgency operations can be vast 
for land forces, the differences can be more subtle for maritime forces. For example, although the 
scale of the challenge may differ, blockades conducted during counterinsurgency operations are 
broadly similar to those implemented in conventional conflicts. The significant amount of overlap 
between roles during conventional and counterinsurgency operations should not cloud their 
importance.  
 Paradoxically, the strengths of maritime forces can shroud the significance of their 
contribution. The flexibility of naval forces and their inherent ability to transition between roles 
can create the impression of a lack of specialism in counterinsurgency. Equally, the  limited 
‘political and diplomatic footprint ashore in comparison to land-based forces’ can be extremely 
useful in minimising local resentment, placating neighbouring nations and reducing the risk of 
casualties, but it can lead to maritime forces becoming a footnote in the popular narrative of 
insurgencies.20 The issue is compounded by the fact that a number of naval roles lack the popular 
appeal of operations that deliver kinetic effect. Blockades, for example, are regularly described as 
involving ‘long periods of monotony’ and being ‘slow’ and ‘boring’, while re-supply operations 
are ‘not glamorous’.21 They may not be glamourous, but operations that shape the battle space are 
crucial to those operating ashore. 
Ironically, the lack of awareness about the maritime contributions to counterinsurgency 
operations has created a platform for increased involvement. In proposing that there is likely to be 
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an ‘Iraq syndrome’ akin to ‘Vietnam syndrome’, James Kurth suggested that the ‘very reaction of 
the American public against ground combat operations may strengthen the Navy’s case for naval 
combat operations’ as ‘maritime counterinsurgency is likely to issue in far fewer casualties’.22 
Geography has also been an important determinant in the significance of the maritime contribution 
to counterinsurgency operations. While the potential of maritime forces could not be fully realised 
during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the future conduct of operations in areas that are more 
susceptible to naval power should not be underestimated. Ultimately, maritime forces have always 
made invaluable but unheralded contributions to counterinsurgency operations. Given the ongoing 
and, potentially, increasing contribution of naval forces it is essential that all aspects of the 
maritime role are understood. 
The Naval Contribution to the Malayan Emergency 
The opportunities for vessels of the Royal Navy to participate in the operations are 
limited, but those which do present themselves are rapidly exploited.23 
      Review of the Emergency Situation in Malaya at the End of 1954 
The Malayan Emergency, which stretched from 1948 to 1960, pitted Commonwealth forces 
against the MRLA or Communist Terrorists (CTs) as they were often called by the security forces. 
John Coates has written: ‘The contribution which the navy could make to the Emergency was 
necessarily limited.’24 From the military perspective, this was very much an infantryman’s conflict. 
Nevertheless, air and naval forces made varied and useful contributions to the successful 
outcome.25 Tim Benbow has noted ‘maritime forces had a significant supporting role that belies 
their usual neglect’, while Chris Tuck described the RN’s efforts as ‘an important, though 
subsidiary, contribution to operations’.26  
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According to The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, the RN contributed to 
the Malayan Emergency by conducting ‘anti-smuggling and anti-piracy patrols’, ‘amphibious 
landings’ and ‘bombardment of CT areas’.27 Other Commonwealth ships played an analogous role, 
with the directive to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, asserting that Royal Australian 
Navy (RAN) ships could be ‘used as for ships of the Royal Navy in Malayan waters to prevent 
infiltration by Communist agents or armed bandits by sea together with anti-terrorist operations in 
Malaya’.28 In addition, the Fleet Air Arm’s medium S-55 helicopters were ‘invaluable’ in 
increasing the tactical mobility of Commonwealth forces.29 Indeed, between 1954 and 1956, the 
Naval Air Squadrons reportedly undertook the ‘major part of the troop-lifting’.30 Infrequent air 
strikes were also conducted from aircraft carriers visiting the area; normally on their way to or 
from Korean War operations. 
Alongside the Royal Malayan Navy and Police, the fundamental role played by 
Commonwealth naval forces and RAF flying boats was the conduct of coastal patrols.31 The 
imposition of a blockade offered the potential to seal off Malaya on three of four sides, with only 
the northern border with Thailand presenting an overland infiltration route. Consequently, the 
surveillance of the coast was afforded great significance. Over 1,000 craft were searched during 
1952 alone.32 Although the threat posed by seaborne infiltration remains questionable, the 
‘constant but unspectacular’ blockade applied a stranglehold on the insurgents in Malaya.33 
Subsequent evaluations have determined that no men or materiel were infiltrated by sea during the 
Malayan Emergency.34 The coastal patrols also offered an opportunity to ‘show the flag’, although 
as one historian noted, the effects of such activities are ‘difficult to quantify’.35 
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Despite the frequent focus on the role of helicopters, the troop landing role performed by 
naval vessels was significant due to the nature of the operating environment. While these landings 
were ‘occasionally coastal’, they were often riverborne operations, with troops being transported 
by landing craft and launches.36 Notably, the so-called Malayan Scouts – the Special Air Service 
(SAS) – were deployed by naval forces in south-east Pahang during Operation Prosaic in 1951 as 
part of a ‘deep jungle penetration’ mission.37 The capacity to deploy land forces from ships was 
extremely useful due the coastal nature of the operating environment and the extensive river 
network. 
Naval bombardment – or NGS – played a more prominent role than is sometimes credited. 
Accounts often recite that 39 bombardments were conducted in 1952, but the contributions 
throughout the remainder of the Malayan Emergency are regularly overlooked. A review of the 
Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1957 observed that the RN had ‘assisted many operations by 
coastal bombardment’.38 Exact numbers of bombardments throughout the Emergency are difficult 
to precisely pinpoint, but the figure is much higher than is often acknowledged. For example, in 
1955, a further 24 bombardments were conducted.39  
The frequency of bombardments fluctuated throughout the Malayan Emergency depending 
on the situation on the ground. Grey has assessed that bombardments were used most frequently 
in the first years of the insurgency when ‘the MRLA was most active and most effective and at a 
time when the security forces’ own resources were most thinly stretched’.40 As coastal areas were 
cleared, bombardment requests dropped concurrently. In 1956, there were just three 
bombardments and it was noted that there had been ‘little call’ for naval gunfire ‘with most coastal 
areas white’.41 Notably, naval vessels made use of the rivers to provide NGS further inland. HMS 
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Amethyst travelled 30 miles up the Perak River to bombard a suspected CT camp in 1952, while 
HMS Defender conducted a shoot nine miles up the Johore River in 1954.42 In early 1956, the 
Director of Operations, Malaya, summarised: ‘Bombardment of the terrorists by ships is a most 
helpful form of support for ground operations, but unfortunately there are not many opportunities 
for this type of attack.’43 However, limited opportunity did not always equate to limited utility.  
NGS: A Destructive or Harassing Capability? 
While the nature of the operating environment inevitably limited the provision of NGS, it was used 
extensively during some operations. For example, during Operation Nassau, five ships fired 346 
6”, 1,307 4.5” and 190 4” rounds, as well as 30 Starshells.44 In fact, between Operations Nassau 
and Rex, all but three ships of the Far East Fleet conducted live bombardments.45 There has been 
an overriding sense that NGS was not overly well coordinated, with one work positing that at least 
two accounts concluded that: ‘the absence of effective shore control, spotting and target 
coordinates resulted in missions that were non-specific “harassment” rather than effective 
“interdiction”.’46 However, while NGS was often used in a harassment role, the intended purpose 
was a lot more diverse than has often been credited. In particular, effective interdiction and 
accurate destructive bombardments were possible when Army Auster aircraft, which undertook 
the roles of ‘target marking’ and spotting, were available.47 
The capacity of the MRLA to move further inland and evade NGS limited its usefulness 
on many occasions. However, when the enemy could be contained in a particular area, NGS had 
the potential to be extremely effective. During Operation Rex, which was conducted on the 
Penggerang peninsula between March and August 1955, the 9th Independent Platoon, MRLA, was 
penned in through a combination of geography and ground activity. Although the platoon only 
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consisted of approximately 25 ‘well armed and well led’ members, they were reported to have had 
‘high morale’ and have been ‘actively aggressive’ in the Kota Tinggi and Penggerang districts. It 
was recorded: ‘R.N. and R.A.F. bombardment was found by the Army to be invaluable in this area 
of extremely difficult going. Bombardments were planned to flush the enemy out of possible 
camping areas, and harass likely escape routes.’48 
NGS was conducted ‘whenever possible’ during the operation.49 The geography of the 
peninsula naturally lent itself to the provision of NGS. The whole target area was in range of the 
guns of the larger ships and most was within reach of the 4” and 4.5” guns of frigates and 
destroyers. NGS, in conjunction with air strikes, took on even greater significance due to the jungle 
environment, which was deemed too dense for the deployment of artillery inland.50 Point targets 
were specifically identified and observation by the RAF’s 1911 Light Liaison Flight was provided 
for almost all of the daytime bombardments.51 An assessment of the operation by the Flag Officer, 
Malayan Area, concluded: ‘Naval participation, with gunfire support, patrol and sea-transport, 
formed an integral part of Operation REX…without naval bombardments and coastal patrols, it is 
probable that the 9th Independent Platoon would still be operating in the area.’52  
Bombardments conducted by HMS Newfoundland between 8 and 9 June 1954 achieved 
notoriety because they were delivered when the ship was diverted from her journey to participate 
in the Queen’s birthday celebrations. The bombardments conducted by the ship provided an 
indication of the nature of NGS in Malaya. After being tasked with providing bombardments for 
security forces operating in Central Kedah, approximately 25 miles north of Penang, arrangements 
were made to facilitate the firings. One inch to the mile maps of the area were provided by the 
Flag Officer, Malayan Area, and communications with an air spotter were organised through the 
Naval Liaison Officer, Kuala Lumpar. The initial instructions designated five targets that each 
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comprised 1,000 square yards of dense jungle. Notably, the targets were at heights of 2,000 to 
3,000 feet and two of them were on the reverse slope of Kedah Peak. The ship was instructed to 
provide harassing fire during designated windows consisting of two to three hours depending on 
the target. Newfoundland was also put on notice to bombard pinpoint targets if CT camps were 
detected by the air spotter.53 
 While the initial order called for harassing fire, reconnaissance of the target areas resulted 
in confirmation that some of them were ‘live’ (actively being used by the CTs). The ship engaged 
a number of targets across the course of two days. In one example, Newfoundland engaged a hut 
that was believed to be part of a CT camp with spotting being provided by Captain D. J. Browne, 
Royal Artillery, in an Auster aircraft. After initial corrections, Newfoundland was able to 
accurately engage the targets, with photographic reconnaissance later indicating two direct hits on 
the hut and two craters within five yards. It is popularly believed that NGS during the Emergency 
was somewhat haphazard. However, it is worth noting that while the shoot was punctuated by the 
ship visiting Penang harbour to enable elements of the crew to participate in the dress rehearsal for 
the Queen’s birthday parade, it offered an opportunity for Captain Browne to visit Newfoundland 
and provide a report on the bombardments, as well as deliver a larger scale map for the shoots on 
the following day. A number of targets were successfully engaged, but the terrain and weather 
(particularly cloud cover) also demonstrated the limitations of NGS. During a bombardment of a 
camp area on 9 June, which was described as being ‘very effective’ following photographic 
reconnaissance, it was noted that while ‘damage must have been done to the contents’, complete 
destruction of a lean-to proved impossible due to the presence of tall trees.54 
 Over the course of the two days, 267 6” high explosive rounds were fired by Newfoundland. 
After assessing reports of the bombardments, the Second-in-Command, Far East Station, deduced 
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that the ship ‘put up a good technical performance in these bombardments’.55 Indeed, 56 Ground 
Liaison Section, RAF Station Butterworth, declared: ‘the bombardment was most successful and 
undoubtedly considerably harassed CTs who were known to be operating in the area West and 
South West of Kedah Peak at the time’.56 Perhaps most telling was a report by HQ 1 Federal 
Division District, Taiping, which stated:  
Ground troops from A and D 5 MALAY followed up the bombardment by HMS 
NEWFOUNDLAND and found that all targets had been effectively engaged and 
destroyed. The reported camp…was an old mining kongai. This had received a 
direct hit from HMS Newfoundland. General comment by troops was that the 
shelling was hundred percent successful.57 
The bombardment was noteworthy not just for its reported success, but also because the operation 
was spotted by the air and subjected to photographic reconnaissance and subsequent sweeps by 
ground forces.  
Success was attributed, in part, to ‘Captain Browne’s most accurate and concise spotting’, 
which was conducted under ‘very trying conditions’.58 In addition, although it was recommended 
that larger scale maps be issued to ‘facilitate height estimation of pin point targets’ in mountainous 
areas – a notion that received support from higher command – the provision of maps was crucial 
for the delivery of NGS.59 As a corollary, Captain E.H. Thomas, Newfoundland’s Commanding 
Officer, reflected: ‘This bombardment has been a very good tonic to the ship after many months 
with little or no chance to carry out practice firing.’60 Newfoundland’s activities demonstrated that 
when properly planned, focussed on appropriate targets, spotted, and subsequently assessed, NGS 
could be effective. 
 The involvement of RAN ships also provided a good indicator of the nature of NGS 
operations during the Emergency. The first bombardments were conducted by HMA Ships Anzac 
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and Tobruk on 29 September 1956 as part of a ‘major security force operation’ to drive 
approximately 400 CTs from southern Johore.61 The targets for the bombardment were in the 
vicinity of Tanjong Balau and the shoot was facilitated by bombardment charts of the area that 
were dropped to both ships by Sunderland aircraft during the previous day. In addition, to pre-
planned targets, additional ones were designated by the Army Auster aircraft that provided 
spotting.62 Each ship separately engaged targets, before two additional ones were subjected to 
‘concentrated fire’ from both vessels, leading to a report of ‘most effective’ shooting.63 Ian 
Pfennigwerth has since observed that the bombardment: ‘was not harassment shooting, and the 
spotter’s presence suggests that there were clearly identified targets to be taken under fire’.64 
 On 22 January 1957, Queenborough and Quickmatch fired 40 rounds each at suspected CT 
positions in Southeast Johore. The targets taken under fire were a coconut grove, which was 
believed to be a source of supplies for the CTs, a nearby wooden bridge and a CT camp. The shoot 
was spotted by an Army Auster aircraft.65 Although the spotter noted that the camp may have been 
empty when it was hit, it was assessed that it was damaged and was ‘unlikely’ to be ‘used for some 
time’.66 On the 25 July 1957, Anzac engaged four separate ‘suspected terrorist positions’ in Johore. 
The shoots were spotted by an observer in an Auster aircraft and while Anzac did not record the 
results of the bombardments, it was noted that ‘good training value was obtained’.67 On 26 August 
1957, Tobruk took seven targets under fire with the Auster aircraft that spotted the shoots reporting 
‘good results’.68  
 The record of NGS was mixed during the Malayan Emergency. Inevitably, there was a 
degree of wastage and it was undoubtedly used inappropriately on occasion. Even when it did 
prove useful, the effect of NGS was never decisive. However, it did make valuable contributions 
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to the success of various operations. Ultimately, the effectiveness of NGS was situationally 
dependent. When it was directed at specific, intelligence-led targets and spotted to improve 
accuracy, as happened more often than is sometimes credited, NGS did have a role to play. 
 
 
NGS: A Psychological Weapon? 
The relevance of NGS during the Malayan Emergency has often been questioned on the basis of 
its purpose, particularly its use in the harassment role. However, as harassing fire is intended to 
keep the enemy off-balance and diminish morale, the psychological effect of NGS was significant. 
Parallels can be drawn to the conduct of aerial bombing in the context of psychological effect. In 
a letter from Sir Evelyn Baring to the Colonial Secretary on 5 December 1953, aerial bombing was 
justified on that basis that as well as casualties being inflicted ‘on a number of occasions’, strikes 
had ‘a detrimental effect on the morale of enemy gangs’.69 Similarly, Colonel W.N. Gray, who 
became Police Commissioner in 1948, observed that air strikes had ‘contributed more than any 
other factor to the number of bandit surrenders’.70 The use of NGS, air power and artillery in the 
harassment role raises questions about efficiency, but the impact on enemy morale must be taken 
into consideration.  
 The psychological effect of NGS was never more apparent than during Operation Nassau, 
which was conducted in the Kuala Langat area with the intention of eliminating a local gang of 
CTs.71 As with all operations during the Emergency, the role of ground forces was fundamental to 
Nassau’s success, but naval power contributed in a number of ways. When Nassau was initiated, 
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Commonwealth forces conducted bombardments with various weapons night and day. From 9 
January to 20 August 1955, the south swamp area was bombarded almost every night.72 Daytime 
bombardment was ceased in March 1955, but nightly harassing fire, as well as morning and 
evening ‘hates’ were conducted against specific targets.73 A summary of the operation noted: 
Initially it was hoped that the effect would be to drive the C.Ts from the centre of 
the swamp into ambushes set around the edge. It is doubtful if this effect was ever 
achieved, but from information given by surrendered enemy personnel it is certain 
that night bombardments had a particularly lowering effect on the morale of the 
C.Ts. If shells or bombs fell uncomfortably close to a camp in the dark, it was found 
that C.Ts were in the habit of moving out, waiting until the bombardment stopped, 
and then moving back again. During night harassing fire, it was therefore the 
practice to re-engage targets which had already been bombarded.74 
Interestingly, as the MRLA reportedly had difficulty distinguishing between the calibre of shells, 
smaller projectiles were able to have a disproportionate effect on morale. MRLA morale was 
considered ‘very high’ prior to the commencement of the operation, but the imposition of food 
control measures and ‘continuous non-stop patrolling, harassing fire and psychological warfare’ 
diminished their confidence until ‘morale broke completely’. As a direct consequence, there was 
an increase in the number of surrenders from June onwards.75  
The Flag Officer, Malayan Area’s report to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, 
assessed: 
The aim of the operation, which was to destroy the M.C.P. [Malayan Communist 
Party] organisation in the Kuala Langat area, was fully achieved. Out of the 37 C.Ts 
in that area, 35 had either been killed, captured or had surrendered by the end of the 
operation. Although these eliminations fell to the ambushes and systematic 
searches of the Land Forces, bombardment by Sea, Land and Air Forces played a 
significant part in lowering morale.76 
While naval power was not decisive in itself, the effect on the morale of the enemy, friendly forces 
and the civilian population was significant and contributed to the success of the operation. 
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 Fire support of all forms aided the maintenance of and improvements in the morale of 
friendly forces. Robert Jackson contended: ‘the presence of strike aircraft provided a great uplift 
to the morale of the troops on the ground, fighting an elusive and ruthless foe in an alien 
environment’.77 While the presence of aircraft has a psychological effect that makes it distinct 
from other forms of firepower, the provision of NGS also helped to reinforce the idea that those 
fighting on the ground were being supported. In addition to undermining the morale of the enemy, 
‘hates’ have always been intended to embolden and strengthen the resolve of friendly forces.78 The 
effect was no different in Malaya. 
 As well as improving the morale of those fighting on the ground, the provision of NGS 
was a huge boon for the crews of Commonwealth ships. During Operation Rex, the Flag Officer, 
Malayan Area, revealed: ‘even an acknowledgement to the ship that the bombardment was 
effective’ was ‘a help to morale onboard’.79 Following Operations Nassau and Rex, the 
Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, informed the Admiralty: ‘The operations afforded 
facilities for live bombardment…with the resultant benefit to the morale of Ships’ Companies that 
can be achieved only by participation in operational firings.’80  
 Finally, the way that fire power was perceived by the friendly civilian population was also 
important. Although often only a ‘secondary aim’, as was the case during Operation Rex, 
bombardments were conducted with the stated intention of improving civilian morale.81 Analysts 
have noted that civilian morale was influenced through the use of air power with Jackson 
suggesting that the effect of air strikes was ‘decisive’ and that the demonstration of force 
‘persuaded many civilians to resist the terrorists and co-operate with the Security Forces’.82 While 
civilian morale was hard to quantify, casual contemporary observations of NGS indicated that the 
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‘long-term benefit’ of ‘raising…civilian morale is incalculable’.83 The psychological effect of 
NGS during the Malayan Emergency is sometimes overlooked by the focus on air power, but its 
influence on enemy, friendly and civilian morale should not underestimated. 
An Imperfect Asset: The Limitations of NGS 
The Malayan Emergency demonstrated that NGS is far from a perfect capability. One of the 
greatest limitations was that the MRLA did not provide a particularly opportune target in terms of 
their overall size, organisation or operating style. A 1948 assessment placed the number of armed 
members between 3,000 and 5,000. Although they were nominally organised into formations that 
resembled regiments, they frequently operated in groups of between 10 and 50 and sometimes 
even fewer.84 The MLRA’s modus operandi also made the effective use of firepower difficult. 
Brigadier Dennis Talbot explained in 1950: 
[B]andits are guerrillas who depend on hit and run tactics…[T]heir object is to 
avoid clashing with the security forces except when the latter are greatly 
outnumbered and taken by surprise…[T]hey do not defend or hold any particular 
area or function on a line of communication.85 
The reluctance of the MLRA to stand and fight meant that engagements were often limited to small 
arms fire. From a sheer numerical perspective, the overall size of the MRLA and the fact that the 
insurgency was spread across Malaya meant that a bountiful selection of targets was never likely. 
Indeed, as the MRLA’s numbers were whittled down through kills, surrenders and desertion, the 
amount of potential targets continued to diminish. Moreover, as the MRLA tended to operate in 
small groups and often relied on ambushes, there was a limit to what firepower could achieve – be 
it NGS, artillery or air power. 
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The ‘seemingly all-concealing tropical jungle’, which was nicknamed the ‘green hell’ by 
British troops, hindered the provision of firepower of all varieties.86 Not only did the CTs use the 
jungle to conceal their activities, but the operating environment sometimes acted as a barrier to the 
effective employment of NGS. The potential for the MRLA to intersperse themselves amongst the 
local populace also ensured that discrimination and restraint were necessary. The spread of fire 
from NGS meant that its use required careful consideration to avoid collateral damage. 
As was the case with air power, the utility of NGS was very much dependent on the 
effectiveness of cooperation between the service branches. When spotting aircraft were not 
provided or were not available for various reasons (including weather), the likely utility of NGS 
was diminished. The much maligned harassment fire could be effective, but that was only the case 
when intelligence confirmed the ongoing presence of the enemy in the bombardment area. 
The most successful bombardments were conducted in conjunction with coordinated 
ground activity. NGS and air strikes could be used to drive CTs from particular areas and into 
engagements with security forces.87 Moreover, follow-up operations were also important in 
helping to provide assessments of the damage done by bombardments. When coordination was 
effective, good results could be achieved, but when unity of effort was lacking, the potential of 
NGS was constrained. Despite the success of Newfoundland’s bombardment in June 1954, it is 
notable that the Naval Liaison Officer at Headquarters, Malaya, lamented: ‘It is unfortunate that 
the 1st Malay Infantry Brigade which supplied the follow-up troops were withdrawn and sent to 
Taiping a few days after the operation.’88 Jointness and coordination between the service branches 
was the key to the successful use of NGS. 
NGS during the Malayan Emergency in Context 
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The closer one examines how this victory was achieved the clearer it becomes that 
it came about in circumstances that were particular, indeed unique, to Malaya.89 
Milton Osborne 
The increasing US commitment to Vietnam in the 1960s inevitably led to commentators and policy 
makers looking back on the Malayan Emergency in order to extract relevant lessons.90 Since then, 
despite vociferous scholarly deliberation about the relevance of the Malayan Emergency, the quest 
to distil lessons for contemporary and future operations goes on unabated. The wider debate about 
whether the Emergency represents an exemplar for counter-insurgency operations is beyond the 
scope of this article, but Donald Mackay’s conclusion is worthy of consideration: 
There are individual lessons to be learnt, but the unique circumstances that allowed 
the colonial power to deal with the terrorist campaign so effectively that it never 
even got as far as being a truly insurgent war were just that-unique. It seems 
unlikely that they will ever be replicated at another time or in another place, and 
those who seek in Malaya a blueprint for counterinsurgency must look elsewhere.91 
While the circumstances that led to the successful outcome of the Malayan Emergency may have 
been unique, the use of naval power was most certainly not. One of the ‘individual lessons’ – 
despite being overlooked or dismissed in most accounts of the Malayan Emergency – was the use 
of NGS. 
Firstly, the notion that NGS was merely ‘mobile’ or ‘floating’ artillery overlooks the 
significance of the capability. When land-based artillery was either unavailable or could not reach 
a target, NGS offered an important replacement capability. During the Emergency, it was noted 
that ‘naval bombardments in support of Security Forces are…of the greatest value on those 
occasions where the targets are inaccessible to land artillery’.92 That lesson was far from new. 
During the prolonged counterinsurgency campaign to end resistance to Habsburg rule, Austro-
Hungarian operations in Bosnia-Hercegovina were able to utilise naval gunfire support when other 
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firepower proved unavailable or insufficient. At Krivošije in 1882, rugged terrain limited the 
involvement of the mountain artillery batteries and led to naval bombardments taking on increasing 
significance. When the insurgents used stone buildings for cover, naval bombardments that were 
spotted with signal flags proved able to destroy the structures when the 70mm mountain guns could 
not.93 The very fact that ships provide a floating gun platform is inherently relevant as the 
subsequent flexibility means that targets can be engaged that may not otherwise be feasible due to 
the absence or limitations of other capabilities. 
 Analyses of the Malayan Emergency have prompted questions about whether NGS was 
required at all. Grey argued that NGS missions were conducted because ‘they were available rather 
than because they were strictly necessary, much less effective’.94 Although the necessity and 
effectiveness of NGS is contentious and, arguably, situationally dependent, the presence and 
flexibility provided by naval ships is significant. Ships were needed for the blockade and the fact 
that they could be used in a power projection role served as a force multiplier. The same was true 
of ships passing through the theatre, as demonstrated by the assertion about Newfoundland that: 
‘Not many ships can say that they have occupied themselves between ceremonial parade rehearsals 
by bombarding the enemy.’95  
The use of NGS must always be contextualised as a subsidiary element of a much larger 
naval role. During the Philippine–American War (1899-1902), it was noted that the United States 
Navy’s blockade meant that it was not easy for the ‘the insurgents to coordinate actions among 
themselves’.96 Max Boot has assessed that the combination of a blockade that prevented the import 
of arms and supplies, re-supply efforts and NGS ensured that the ‘army could not have won without 
the navy’.97 NGS may not have been the primary naval role, but it was a welcome contribution to 
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the counterinsurgency campaign. It would seem only logical that if ships are present to conduct a 
range of tasks that they be equipped and trained to meet fire support requirements. NGS was not 
conducted during the Emergency because the ships were there. Rather, NGS could be provided 
when necessary because the ships were already there conducting other important missions. 
Although NGS during the Emergency has sometimes been dismissed as harassment fire, it 
proved useful in that context in Malaya and in both earlier and later conflicts in diminishing the 
morale of enemy forces. Sam Sarkesian concluded that the Battle of Manila (1899) demonstrated 
that ‘regardless of numbers and the protection of trenches and redoubts, the insurgent forces could 
not or would not stand up before the American forces, particularly when American attacks were 
supported by artillery and naval gunfire’.98 Following the Battle of Surabya in November 1945 
during the British involvement in the Netherlands East Indies, Major-General Robert Mansergh, 
commander of the 5th Indian Division, noted: ‘The accurate and willing support of the RN and 
RAF has been a considerable factor in the success of this operation and has again earned the 
admiration and thanks of the ground forces.’99 Given the willingness of a sizeable portion of the 
local population to engage in fighting, artillery support, NGS and air strikes were assessed to have 
been crucial as they had ‘the effect of clearing the fighting area of a large proportion of the mob, 
leaving the field clear for the more organised force’.100 
A use was even found for NGS during the Tanganyikan Army mutiny in 1964. Although 
firings against Colito barracks were discounted after consideration of the likely consequences, 
HMS Cambrian still provided a demonstration bombardment during the assault by 45 Commando, 
Royal Marines, in order to demoralise the enemy.101 Equally, while the use of harassment fire 
during the Vietnam War has often been deemed profligate, Captain E.E. Johnston, HMAS 
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Vendetta’s Commanding Officer, declared in the midst of the conflict: 
the purpose served by harassment fire as against the cost involved has been a matter 
of conjecture in my mind since the commencement of this deployment. It was 
therefore gratifying to hear a report from the spotter that a V.C. defector during 
interrogation had stated that his ‘unit had become completely demoralised during 
the past two to three weeks because of the heavy mortars from the sea’.102 
The effectiveness of harassment fire is notoriously hard to quantity and there was undoubtedly 
wastage during the Vietnam War, but that does not mean that the psychological effect of the 
weapon did not produce positive results under the right circumstances. Equally, the Malayan 
Emergency demonstrated that NGS also has the potential to improve the morale of friendly forces. 
NGS, like other aspects of firepower, can be particularly heartening for land forces when they are 
aware that their adversaries cannot rely on the same capabilities. 
 Just because NGS can be effective during small wars and insurgencies, does not mean that 
it will be or that it will not be used excessively. Certain conditions are necessary in order to 
maximise the efficiency of NGS. One account of intelligence during the Emergency surmised the 
‘contribution of intelligence’ to NGS operations was ‘not great’, declaring that ‘intelligence 
jigsaws were vastly incomplete’.103 The most successful NGS missions were those that were 
grounded in sound and timely intelligence. During the Vietnam War, RAN officers complained 
that a significant degree of harassment and interdiction fire was wasted as the targets were based 
on stale information.104 Conversely, Austro-Hungarian counterinsurgency operations in Bosnia-
Hercegovina during 1882 were intelligence-led and based on the reconnaissance of local resistance 
groups, which allowed troops to converge on the enemy with the support of a range of firepower. 
At Cattaro, for example, mountain artillery was usefully supplemented with bombardments by the 
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Austro-Hungarian Navy.105 As with all aspects of firepower, the availability of accurate 
intelligence enhances the likely effectiveness of NGS.  
 The selection of appropriate targets is also a necessary precursor to effective NGS. In the 
harassment role, it was discovered that in Malaya ‘there was little differentiation, from the C.Ts 
point of view, between small and large calibre shells’, which meant that aside from longer range 
of 6” guns, the use of cruisers for that purpose was deemed to be ‘uneconomical’.106 The matching 
of appropriate targets to the capability was one of the clear lessons about NGS that emerged from 
the conflict. The same principle was demonstrated during the Vietnam War. Captain David Leach, 
Commanding Officer of HMAS Perth during the ship’s second deployment to Vietnam, opined in 
1968 that NGS was sometimes used against inappropriate targets. In one instance, Perth, with the 
assistance of two A4s in the spotting role, damaged a bridge, before it was subsequently obliterated 
by eight 500lb bombs dropped by the same aircraft. Captain Leach lamented: ‘this I think clearly 
illustrates the way NGS with high muzzle velocity and inherent range spreads is being misused in 
this war on point targets which can be more efficiently dealt with by air ordnance’.107  
In Malaya, the effectiveness of NGS was perceived to have been enhanced when it was 
conducted in conjunction with related ground action. Likewise, in Vietnam, it was noted that the 
usefulness of NGS could be negated if friendly troops did not conduct ‘concerted drives to clear 
the area’.108 In contrast, close coordination between land and naval forces was achieved during the 
Asturian Revolt in Spain in 1934 when revolutionaries ‘barricaded’ themselves in the working-
class areas of Gijón.109 With the revolutionary forces effectively besieged, the 8-inch guns of the 
cruiser Libertad shelled Gijón as a precursor to an aggressive and successful assault by the Army 
of Africa.110 Although there may be an occasional exception to the rule, such as the operation to 
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re-take South Georgia during the Falklands War when the bombardment by HM Ships Plymouth 
and Antrim was so extensive that it compelled the Argentine forces under Lieutenant Commander 
Alfredo Astiz to surrender before the fire plan could be completed, NGS is most effective when it 
is combined with land and/or air power.111  
The lack of NGS during recent counterinsurgency operations is not representative of the 
overall trend. While it is now used much more sparingly, NGS remains a feature of contemporary 
operations. During the assault on the Al Faw Peninsula in Iraq in 2003, HM Ships Chatham, 
Marlborough and Richmond and HMAS Anzac fired 155 rounds during 17 missions. Over the 
course of Operation Ellamy – the 2011 intervention in Libya – British and French ships engaged 
in 50 NGS missions, firing over 500 rounds in the process.  
Although the assault on the Al Faw was very much a conventional operation, parallels can 
be drawn in the use of NGS. During the 2003 Iraq War, coalition forces had not initially envisioned 
a need for NGS, but the presence of gun-equipped ships that were involved in maritime 
interception operations meant that the capability could be called upon when the requirement 
unexpectedly arose. The 155mm artillery positioned on Bubyian Island was unable to reach the tip 
of the Al Faw and plans to use Landing Craft Air Cushion Class Hovercrafts to land light armour 
and artillery on the beach were scrapped in view of the threat posed by Iraqi mines.112 Competing 
demands for close air support and difficult flying conditions served to further enhance the 
significance of NGS being available.   
The psychological element of NGS was also a key factor in its employment. As the Royal 
Marines advanced to contact, a call for fire with ‘danger close’ was placed to eradicate threats 
posed by fixed installations such as artillery and bunkers. Initial rounds were generally offset so 
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that they would fall close to, but not on the target; a tactic that was accompanied by the use of loud 
speakers to deliver messages with the intention being to induce surrenders, which generally proved 
to be successful. However, the kinetic effect of NGS was also demonstrated with the destruction 
of enemy artillery and structures.113 Although it would be easy to dismiss the Malayan Emergency 
as a historical anachronism, principles about the circumstances in which NGS is most likely to be 
effective are enduring. NGS is a blunt tool and can only ever play a limited role, but the 
contribution may be vital to those serving on land.  
Conclusion: A Situationally Dependent Capability 
Ucko and Robert Egnell have rightly noted: ‘As the grievance and conditions from which 
insurgents draw their strength are usually social or political or economic in nature, it follows that 
defeating the insurgent group will typically require more than a merely military approach.’114 The 
military role, including the maritime contribution, will necessarily be limited. Although it was 
sometimes used inappropriately, naval power was relevant during the Malayan Emergency. As 
was the case in a variety of conflicts before and after the Malayan Emergency, naval forces made 
a number of important contributions, not least the conduct of a blockade. Ships were not deployed 
for the purpose of NGS, which was a subsidiary role, but that does not mean that it was not a 
welcome contribution under the right circumstances. The limitations of the capability and the 
challenges of the operating environment constrained the overall effect that NGS had on the 
outcome of the Emergency – although that conclusion was true of all elements of firepower given 
the nature of the campaign. Nevertheless, when used selectively, NGS was able to have a localised 
effect and contributed to the success of operations. When based on accurate intelligence, supported 
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by sufficient observation and directed against appropriate targets, NGS remains an effective 
capability.  
 Accurate fire against pinpoint targets during the Malayan Emergency was constrained by 
the limitations of technology and the challenges presented by the operating environment, but even 
then, it proved possible on occasion. Since the Emergency, NGS has been used to successfully 
engage fixed installations and fielded forces. However, the utility of NGS transcends its mere 
destructive effect. As the ships are not visible, there is no warning of bombardments and the 
intended targets generally will not have the opportunity to respond, NGS can have a devastating 
psychological effect. In demoralising the enemy, while at the same time boosting the morale of 
the supported arm and the ship’s crew, NGS can provide an effect that cannot be quantified by any 
kind of damage assessment.  
Conflicts since the Malayan Emergency, including in Iraq and Libya, have reinforced the 
notion that NGS still has a role to play, albeit limited. Firepower can be viewed through the 
metaphor of a ‘Swiss Army Knife’. As there is no universal tool for every job, a range are provided 
in order to ensure effectiveness. In the case of small wars and insurgencies, more niche tools are 
often required. However, occasionally, situations will arise when a tried and trusted capability such 
as NGS can significantly aid the effort on land. When that opportunity arises, it is important that 
NGS can be effectively utilised.  
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